Old Dominion University

ODU Digital Commons
Modeling, Simulation & Visualization Engineering
Faculty Publications

Modeling, Simulation & Visualization Engineering

2009

Applying the Information Age Combat Model:
Quantitative Analysis of Network Centric
Operations
Sean Deller
Old Dominion University, sdell002@gsa.odu.edu

Shannon R. Bowling
Old Dominion University

Ghaith A. Rabadi
Old Dominion University, grabadi@odu.edu

Andreas Tolk
Old Dominion University, atolk@odu.edu

Michael I. Bell

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/msve_fac_pubs
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, International Relations Commons, and the
Military and Veterans Studies Commons
Repository Citation
Deller, Sean; Bowling, Shannon R.; Rabadi, Ghaith A.; Tolk, Andreas; and Bell, Michael I., "Applying the Information Age Combat
Model: Quantitative Analysis of Network Centric Operations" (2009). Modeling, Simulation & Visualization Engineering Faculty
Publications. 28.
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/msve_fac_pubs/28

Original Publication Citation
Tolk, A., Deller, S., Bell, M. I., Bowling, S. R., Rabadi, G. A., & Huber, R. (2009). Applying the information age combat model:
Quantitative analysis of network centric operations. The International C2 Journal, 3(1), 1-25.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Modeling, Simulation & Visualization Engineering at ODU Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Modeling, Simulation & Visualization Engineering Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@odu.edu.

THE

INTERNATIONAL

C2~0URNAL
VOLUME 3, NUMBER 1, 2009

SPECIAL ISSUE

Modeling and Simulation in Support
of Network-Centric Approaches and Capabilities
GUEST EDITOR

Andreas Tolk

Old Dominion University

Applying the Information Age Combat Model:
Quantitative Analysis of Network Centric Operations
Sean Deller
Michael I. Bell
Shannon R. Bowling
Ghaith A. Rabadi
Andreas Tolk

THE INTERNATIONAL C2 JOURNAL
David S. Alberts, Chairman of the Editorial Board, OASD-NII, CCRP

The Editorial Board
Berndt Brehmer (SWE), Swedish National Defence College
Reiner Huber (GER), Universitaet der Bundeswehr Muenchen
Viggo Lemche (DEN), Danish Defence Acquisition and Logistics Organization
James Moffat (UK), Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL)
Sandeep Mulgund (USA), The MITRE Corporation
Mark Nissen (USA), Naval Postgraduate School
Ross Pigeau (CAN), Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC)
Mink Spaans (NED), TNO Defence, Security and Safety
Andreas Tolk (USA), Old Dominion University

About the Journal
The International C2 Journal was created in 2006 at the urging of an international group of command and control professionals including individuals from
academia, industry, government, and the military. The Command and Control
Research Program (CCRP, of the U.S. Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Networks and Information Integration, or OASD-NII) responded
to this need by bringing together interested professionals to shape the purpose
and guide the execution of such a journal. Today, the Journal is overseen by an
Editorial Board comprising representatives from many nations.
Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are
solely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the
Department of Defense, or any other U.S. Government agency.
Rights and Permissions: All articles published in the International C2 Journal remain the intellectual property of the authors and may not be distributed
or sold without the express written consent of the authors.

For more information
Visit us online at: www.dodccrp.org
Contact our staff at: publications@dodccrp.org
Focus
& Convergence
for Complex Endeavors

The International C2 Journal | Vol 3, No 1

Applying the Information Age Combat
Model: Quantitative Analysis
of Network Centric Operations
Sean Deller, Shannon R. Bowling, Ghaith A. Rabadi,
and Andreas Tolk (Old Dominion University, USA)
Michael I. Bell (Alidade Incorpoated, USA)

Abstract
The nature of and the approach to command and control is evolving in
order to meet the challenges of Information Age warfare. One of the
main tasks of command and control is the arrangement of the assets
within a combat force in order to ensure their ability to manage and
exploit information. Connectivity between the various assets represents
existence, capacity, reliability, and other attributes of links establishing
the connectivity. The Information Age Combat Model was introduced by
Cares in 2005 to contribute to the development of an understanding of
the influence of connectivity on force effectiveness that can lead eventually to quantitative prediction and guidelines for design and employment.
This paper describes the model and several extensions to it. It presents an
initial attempt to achieve such an understanding through the quantitative
analysis of a basic but powerful model of network centric operations to
demonstrate the correlation between connectivity and effectiveness. It also
documents first prototypical studies showing how these results can be used
in current models and can even contribute to a new generation of combat
models that are net-centric instead of using the current platform-centric
approach.
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Introduction
“New approaches to accomplishing the functions that are associated
with Command and Control are becoming an essential part of an
Information Age transformation of military and civilian institutions;
such a transformation is required to meet twenty-first century security
challenges.” (Alberts, 2007, 2)
While the nature of and the approach to command and control is
evolving in order to meet the challenges of Information Age warfare, the essential functions that must be accomplished remain
constant. One of those essential functions is the organization, or
“arrangement” (from the definition of “Command and Control” in
Joint Publication 1-02, 79-80), of the assets within a combat force.
Certainly, the many different ways to arrange a given set of assets
will have different impacts on the combat effectiveness of the force.
Some arrangements will enable self-synchronization, while other
arrangements will impede it. How then, should an Information Age
combat force be organized in order to optimize its effectiveness?
The concept of Network Centric Operations (NCO) represents a
shift from traditional attrition-based approaches to a warfighting
style that emphasizes speed of command and self-synchronization.
One goal of NCO is to field a force that is capable of achieving
information superiority, i.e. “having a dramatically better awareness
or understanding of the battlespace rather than simply more raw
data” (Cebrowski and Garstka 1998, 32), thus enabling a massing of
effects instead of the traditional massing of forces that will disrupt
the enemy’s strategy and preclude his courses of action. Prior to the
introduction of the NCO concept, assessment of the combat potential of a force tended to focus on force composition (the number
of platforms or other entities of each type) and individual platform
capabilities, with force lay-down (spatial distribution) and employment (tactics) as important but scenario-dependent factors. Network
centric operations shift the focus towards the information-based
aspects of force employment: information collection, communica-
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tion, and exploitation. Central to the ability of a force to manage
and exploit information is its connectivity: the existence, capacity,
reliability, and other attributes of the links that connect its platforms,
command and control centers, and other entities. A fundamental
problem is to develop an understanding of the influence of connectivity on force effectiveness that can lead eventually to quantitative
prediction and guidelines for design and employment.
This paper presents an initial attempt to achieve such an understanding through the quantitative analysis of a basic but powerful
model of network centric operations and demonstrate the correlation between connectivity and effectiveness. Furthermore, it shows
possible ways to apply implications and results of such simple models to new modeling and simulation approaches in support of legacy
models of operations with military participation and introduces prototypical implementations for a potential new generation of combat
models.

The Information Age Combat Model (IACM)
The Information Age Combat Model (IACM), recently introduced
by Cares (2005), attempts to describe combat (or competition)
between distributed, networked forces or organizations. The basic
objects of this model are not platforms or other entities capable of
independent action, but rather nodes that can perform elementary
tasks (sense, decide, or influence) and links that connect these nodes.
Information flow between the nodes is generally necessary for any
useful activity to occur. This focus on “network-centric” rather than
“platform-centric” operations is intended to advance the state of the
art in combat modeling “by explicitly representing interdependencies, properly representing complex local behaviors and capturing
the skewed distribution of networked performance” (Cares 2005,
34).
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The IACM employs four types of nodes defined by the following
properties:
•

Sensors receive signals about observable phenomena from other
nodes and send them to Deciders;

•

Deciders receive information from Sensors and make decisions
about the present and future arrangements of other nodes;

•

Influencers receive directions from Deciders and interact with
other nodes to affect the state of those nodes;

•

Targets are nodes that have military value but are not Sensors,
Deciders, or Influencers.

These properties represent the minimum required for each type of
node. Other possible characteristics will emerge in the following discussion. Each node belongs to a “side” in the competition, of which
there are at least two. We will restrict the present discussion to two
sides, conventionally termed BLUE and RED. In principle, any pair
of nodes can interact, regardless of side, but some restrictions will be
found to occur for both theoretical and practical reasons. It is worth
noting that Influencers can act on any type of node, and Sensors
can detect any type. The Target type was introduced primarily to
reflect the fact that not all military assets fall into one of the other
three types. In most situations, however, an Influencer will target an
adversary Sensor, Decider, or Influencer.
The basic combat network shown in figure 1 represents the simplest
situation in which one side can influence another. The BLUE Sensor
(S) detects the RED Target (T) and informs the BLUE Decider (D)
of the contact. The Decider then instructs the BLUE influencer (I)
to engage the Target. The Influencer initiates effects, such as exerting physical force, psychological or social influence, or other forms
of influence on the target. The process may be repeated until the
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Decider determines that the desired effect has been achieved. It
should be noted that the effect assessment requires sensing, which
means that this will be conducted in a new circle.

S

cf,n··. .-'0
D

T

I

Figure 1. The basic combat network represents the simplest situation in which one side can influence another.

Each of the four links in figure 1 is shown with a different type
of line in order to emphasize the fact that the flows across these
links may be very different. In particular, some links may represent
purely physical interactions, while others may entail both physical
processes and information flows. The figures in this paper utilize the
basic elements of graph theory. For more details on graph theory
the interested reader is referred to Chartrand (1984).
Cares (2005) described the simplest complete (two-sided) combat
network as having 36 possible links. While the number of possible
links for eight nodes (four each for BLUE and RED) is 64, we were
able to exclude 28 and reduce that number to 36 based on the following important assumptions:
•

Targets are passive; their only role is to be sensed and influenced. Therefore, 12 links from Targets to any nodes other than
a Sensor were excluded.
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•

Sensors take no action; they provide information to Deciders
and Sensors. Therefore, 10 links from Sensors to any nodes other
than a Sensor or own Decider were excluded.

•

Deciders act only through Influencers but can be sensed. Therefore, 6 links from Deciders to any adversary nodes except a Sensor were excluded.

The resulting BLUE (depected in black) and RED (depicted in gray)
combat networks are shown in figure 2.

S

D

S

T

I

T

D

I

Figure 2. The simplest complete combat network represents all the
ways in which Sensors, Deciders, Influencers and Targets interact
meaningfully with each other.

When the BLUE/RED symmetry is taken into account, the number
of link types is reduced to 18. These are listed in table 1, where the
nodes are identified as in figure 2. Links between a node and itself in
figure 2 have been interpreted as connecting two different nodes of
the same type and side.
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Table 1. Types of Links Available in the IACM

Link
From
Type
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

SBLUE

To

Interpretation

SRED

SBLUE S detecting own S, or S
SRED coordinating with own S

SBLUE

DBLUE

SRED

DRED

SBLUE

SRED

SRED

SBLUE

DBLUE
DRED
DRED

DRED

DBLUE

IBLUE

DRED

IRED

DBLUE TBLUE
DRED

TRED

11

S detecting adversary S

12
13

D commanding own D

14

D commanding own I

15

D commanding own T

16

S detecting adversary D

17

DBLUE

SRED

DRED

SBLUE

IBLUE

SBLUE I attacking own S, or S
SRED detecting own I

IRED

10

S reporting to own D

SBLUE S detecting own D, or D
SRED commanding own S

DBLUE DBLUE

Link
From
Type

18

IBLUE
IRED
IBLUE

To

Interpretation

DBLUE I attacking own D, or I
DRED reporting to own D

IRED

IBLUE I attacking own I, or I
IRED coordinating with own I

IBLUE

TBLUE

IRED

TRED

IBLUE

SRED I attacking adversary S, or S
SBLUE detecting adversary I

IRED
IBLUE

DRED

IRED

DBLUE

IBLUE

IRED

IRED

IBLUE

IBLUE

TRED

IRED

TBLUE

TBLUE

SBLUE

TRED

SRED

TBLUE

SRED

TRED

SBLUE

I attacking own T

I attacking adversary D
I attacking adversary I
I attacking adversary T
S detecting own T
S detecting adversary T

The interpretation of some of the links (types 1, 4, 9, 10, 11, and
13 in table 1) is ambiguous. This was recognized in the initial development of the IACM (Cares 2005), and resolving this issue was
described as both “the next major advance” in the development
of the model and a requirement for “practical” (i.e., quantitative)
analysis based on it. The simulations presented here are a step in
this direction, since they employ only basic combat networks similar
to figure 1, but with the Target replaced by an adversary Sensor or
Influencer. These “combat cycles” (Cares 2005) contain only links of
types 2, 3, 6, 13, and 15. Of these, only type 13 is ambiguous. Both
interpretations of this link will be used, but the context of the model
always makes clear which is intended.
Once the IACM has been defined in terms of a network of nodes
and links, the language and tools of graph theory (see, for example,
Chartrand 1984) can be used for both description and analysis. A
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concise description of any graph is provided by the adjacency matrix
A, in which the row and column indices represent the nodes, and the
matrix elements are either one or zero according to the rule: Aij =
1, if there exists a link from node i to node j and Aij = 0, otherwise.
Many properties of a graph or network can be calculated directly
from the adjacency matrix, and two are of particular interest here.
Since combat power or influence can be exerted only when there
exists a connected cycle that includes the node to be influenced, the
detection of cycles in the graph is of great importance. One method
used in studying the evolution of complex adaptive systems (chemical, biological, social, and economic) is calculation of the principal
(maximum) eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix (Jain and Krishna,
1998). The existence of a real, positive principal eigenvalue of Aij is
guaranteed by the Perron-Frobenius theorem, and this eigenvalue
λPFE (and the corresponding eigenvector) are often referred to as the
Perron-Frobenius Eigenvalue (eigenvector). It is readily shown (Jain
and Krishna, 1999) that for a graph with no closed cycles λPFE = 0.
For a graph with a single cycle of any length, one obtains λPFE = 1.
Graphs with more complicated cycle structures have λPFE > 1. This
had led to the proposal (Cares 2005) that λPFE be adopted as a measure of the ability of a network to produce feedback effects in general and combat power specifically in the case of the IACM. This is
essentially the hypothesis explored in the present work.
An alternative, but closely related approach is based on the fact that
An (the nth power of the adjacency matrix) can be used to obtain the
number of distinct paths connecting any pair of nodes (Chartrand
1984). Specifically, (An)ij , which is the ij matrix element of An, is equal
to the number of distinct paths of length n connecting nodes i and j.
In particular, (An)ii is the number of distinct closed paths from node
i back to itself. If node i is an adversary Target T, then (An)TT is the
number of distinct combat cycles of length n that include T. This
represents the number of different ways that T can be engaged by
the opposing force. In general, combat cycles must be of length at
least four, and if the links are restricted to the types shown in figure 1,
they must be of length exactly four. In this case, the matrix element
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(A4)TT is equal to the number of combat cycles that pass through
the Target T and is therefore a potential measure of the combat
power that can be brought to bear on it. Under special conditions
that will be described below, it is possible to establish a quantitative
connection between λPFE and (A4)TT, lending further support to the
hypothesis that λPFE can be used as a measure of effectiveness for a
distributed, networked force or organization.

A Basic Agent-Based Model Using the IACM
The structure of the IACM makes it clear that the λPFE is a quantifiable metric with which to measure the organization of a networked
force, but is it an indicator of combat effectiveness? To determine
this we constructed an agent-based model representation of the
IACM and conducted a series of force-on-force engagements using
opposing forces of equal assets and capabilities, but differing in their
connectivity arrangements or configurations. These differences in
connectivity often, but not necessarily, lead to unequal λPFE values.
The agent-based paradigm was utilized for this purpose because the
resulting models provide the ability to account for small unit organization, maneuver, and the networked effects that are the focus of our
investigation. An additional advantage of utilizing an agent-based
model was the ability to work around the ambiguities of link interpretation in the IACM. For example, instead of a mutually exclusive
choice between defining a directional link from a BLUE Influencer
to a RED Sensor (type 13 in table 1) as either the Influencer “targeting” the Sensor or as the Sensor “sensing” the Influencer, both
abilities can be represented in the agent-based model. The agentbased modeling environment utilized for this research was NetLogo
(Wilenski 1999).
The first challenge in modeling the IACM concerned the adjacency
matrix representation of the network. The IACM as originally
described by Cares (2005) uses a single adjacency matrix to reflect
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the collective organization of both BLUE and RED forces. In this
approach, the λPFE value is dependent on the configurations of both
the BLUE and RED forces and might well represent the extent to
which feedback effects occur in the engagement. Obviously, BLUE
and RED each seek separately to maximize their own networked
effects while minimizing those of the opposing force. This cannot
be represented by a single λPFE value, so we calculate separate values (λBLUE and λRED) to reflect the potential networked effects of the
configurations of each of the opposing forces. These calculations
required the adjacency matrices include a single Target node representative of all the enemy forces capable of being targeted. In
other words, the values of λBLUE and λRED are determined solely by
the arrangement of their respective assets, independent of the asset
arrangement of the opposing force.
The code of the agent-based model closely follows the logic of
the IACM, with a few notable exceptions. Agents served as Sensors, Deciders, and Influencers, but Targets were not included as
they served no purpose other than to absorb losses. Given that this
work represents a “first cut” effort, including Target agents with no
detect, direct, or influence capabilities would only serve to clutter
the results. Additionally, Deciders cannot be destroyed in the present
model. This was done in recognition of their unique role in connecting multiple Sensors and Influencers. Destruction of a Decider typically renders a number of other nodes useless (effectively destroyed),
making it a particularly high value target. Since targets are detected
and engaged in random order in our model, we wished to give all
targets equal value in order not to generate atypical engagements
that might bias the results.
The agent rules sets, themselves, function in accordance with the
IACM. Sensors detect enemy nodes within the sensing range parameter, and communicate that information to their assigned (connected) Deciders. Deciders communicate the sensing information
to their assigned Influencers. Influencers destroy the nearest enemy
node that is both “sensed” by a Sensor connected to that Influenc-
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er’s Decider, and within the influencing range parameter. Deciders
direct Sensor movement towards areas of suspected enemy nodes.
Deciders direct Influencers to move towards the nearest “sensed”
enemy node. All nodes are assumed to perform their functions perfectly and instantaneously. Errors and delays representing technological and human performance factors will be addressed in followon work. First efforts are addressed in a later section of this article.
Most importantly, the rule sets and parameter values for both BLUE
and RED agents were identical.

Structure of the Experiment
In order to best associate any difference in force effectiveness to the
difference in connectivity, the opposing forces consisted of the same
number of Sensors, Deciders, and Influencers, differing only in the
manner in which they were arranged (i.e., linked). To preclude any
bias between Sensors and Influencers, both forces contained equal
numbers of them with equal capabilities (i.e., the sensing range was
chosen equal to the influencing range, and the speeds of movement
of the two types of node were equal). Consequently, the composition
of both forces followed an X-Y-X-1 (Sensor-Decider-InfluencerTarget) template.
For any particular values of X and Y, there is a finite number of
ways to arrange those assets. In order to gain a “first order” understanding of the IACM, we made two key scoping decisions. First,
each Sensor and Influencer would only be connected to one Decider
(but any given Decider could be connected to multiple Sensors and
Influencers). Second, the connectivity within any X-Y-X-1 force
was limited to only those “vertical” links necessary to create combat cycles (i.e., link types 2, 3, 6, 13, and 15), which are the essence
of the λPFE (the most basic element of the IACM). As noted below,
future work will include “horizontal” links between Sensors, Deciders, and Influencers, such as link types 1, 5, and others. This can
significantly enhance both the λPFE value and the performance of
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any given network configuration, but it requires the introduction of
additional rules to manage and exploit the information carried by
these links. The present model provides a baseline for assessing the
effect of adding additional types of links. In addition the simplification used here is sufficient to insure that (λPFE)4 is equal to (A4)TT,
providing the exact, quantitative relationship mentioned previously
between λPFE and the number of combat cycles.
While the X-Y-X-1 template significantly scoped the focus of this
effort, the number of possible configurations for a given force still
becomes large very quickly. For example, there are a total of nine
possible ways to distribute four Sensors and four Influencers across
three Deciders (see figure 3). No matter how you distribute them,
one Decider will have two Sensors linked to it, and one Decider
(which may or may not be the same Decider) will have two Influencers assigned to it. Fortunately, since the nodes of the IACM are
generic it is possible to reduce this set by eliminating those configurations that are, in effect, identical. The only meaningful difference
between the nine possible configurations of a 4-3-4-1 networked
force is whether the Decider that is linked to two Sensors is the
same Decider that is linked to two Influencers. All other possible
configurations are duplicative of the first two (and are shaded gray).
Adding a single Sensor and Influencer yields a 5-3-5-1 networked
force, which can be organized in 36 different ways. By applying this
same logic, we reduce those 36 possible configurations to only eight
meaningfully different configurations. Even with these most basic of
examples, the difference between the number of possible configurations and number of meaningfully different combinations becomes
quite apparent.

Configuration Number

Number of Sensors
linked to Decider 1

Number of Sensors
linked to Decider 2

Number of Sensors
linked to Decider 3

Number of Influencers
linked to Decider 1

Number of Influencers
linked to Decider 2

Number of Influencers
linked to Decider 3
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1

2

1

1

2

1

1

2

2

1

1

1

2

1

3

2

1

1

1

1

2

4

1

2

1

2

1

1

5

1

2

1

1

2

1

6

1

2

1

1

1

2

7

1

1

2

2

1

1

8

1

1

2

1

2

1

9

1

1

2

1

1

2
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Figure 3. There are nine possible configurations of a 4-3-4-1 networked force, but only two (unshaded) are meaningfully different.

Identifying the meaningful configurations is crucial for the purpose of scoping the problem. While a 7-3-7-1 networked has 225
possible configurations, applying this same logic reduces this to a
much more manageable number of only 42 meaningfully different
configurations. Testing each of the 225 possible configurations of a
7-3-7-1 networked force against all 225 possible configurations of
an opposing 7-3-7-1 networked force would require 50,625 unique
engagements, but 42 combinations would only require 1,764 unique
engagements. Since the number of meaningful combinations for
any given set of nodes is a function of the number of unique values
of the allocation combinations of X across Y, we attempted to define
the function in order to automatically generate the combinations.
This was not a simple task. Although the allocation resembles a partition problem, the exact numerical sequence of the numbers of
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meaningful combinations was difficult to establish. Since determining what this function might be is not the purpose of this research,
we calculated the numbers of meaningful combinations for all X-YX-1 forces where X < 10 and Y < 7 using a simple algorithm based
on the numbers of unique values for the distributions of Sensors and
Influencers across the Deciders. The resulting totals are summarized
in figure 4:
Number of Deciders (Y)

Numbers of Sensors (X)
and Influencers (X)

3

4

5

6

7

3

1

4

2

1

5

8

2

1

6

19

9

2

1

7

42

27

9

2

1

8

78

74

30

9

2

9

139

168

95

31

9

10

224

363

248

105

31

Figure 4. The numbers of meaningful combinations of all X-Y-X-1
networked forces where X < 10 and Y < 7.

Identical configurations always have the same λPFE value; however,
it is possible for meaningfully different configurations to share the
same λPFE value. The adjacency matrices for all meaningful configurations will only differ in two sections (see the unshaded sections of
an example adjacency matrix in figure 5), regardless of the total
numbers of Sensors, Deciders, or Influencers. These unshaded sections reflect the connectivity of each Sensor and Influencer to a particular Decider, and vary by configuration based on the allocation
of Sensors and Influencers across the Deciders. The shaded areas
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represent the absolute absence of any links between those types of
nodes (such as the “horizontal” links discussed earlier), or the absolute existence of links between those types of nodes (such as the
links from all BLUE influencers to the RED Target). Since fourteen of sixteen sections of the adjacency matrices for each of the 42
configurations are identical, the variance between the λPFE values is
greatly reduced.

From

To
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
D
D
D
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
T

S
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1

S
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1

S
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1

S
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1

S
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1

S
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1

S
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1

D
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

D
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

D
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

I
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

I
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

I
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

I
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

I
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

I
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

I
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

T
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0

Figure 5. An adjacency matrix for one of the 42 meaningfully different configurations of a 7-3-7-1 networked force.

In the case of a 7-3-7-1 networked force, the 42 meaningfully different configurations had 30 unique λPFE values ranging from 1.821 to
2.280. The full range of mathematical values for a λPFE of an adjacency matrix containing 18 nodes is from 0 (for a network with no
links at all) to 18 (for a maximally connected network). Note that the
range of λPFE values for the 42 meaningful combinations of a 7-3-7-1
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force is only a small segment of this full range due to the few differences between the links within any two of those configurations. The
cause of this constrained range, however, is significant and becomes
apparent when applying the statistical measures from various studies
of network systems compiled by Cares (2005).
Of all the network statistics referenced in those studies, the λPFE was
the only one that varied in value between the 42 meaningful configurations; all others remained constant. Each configuration consists
of the same numbers of nodes (18) and links (28). Each configuration shares a similar skewed degree distribution and, consequently,
since each path within these configurations is the shortest path, the
betweeness value for each configuration must also be skewed. Each
configuration lacks any direct connectivity between its largest hubs,
such as between Deciders or from any Decider directly to the Target
node. Likewise, the characteristic path length, clustering coefficient,
path horizon, neutrality rating, and susceptibility of each of these
configurations is identical. Given that the λPFE is the only one of
these metrics that varies between these configurations, it is the only
one of these metrics that might measure any potential variation in
the effectiveness of these 42 configurations.
Since the focus of this effort is to gain insight into the relationship
between the λPFE value and the effectiveness of a networked force,
the agent-based model rules of engagement were quite simple.
Engagements continued until either all of the Sensors and Influencers of one force were annihilated, or both forces were incapable of
continued combat (i.e., neither side contained a functioning combat
cycle). A single run of the agent-based model will result in a BLUE
win, a RED win, or an undecided result.
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Initial Results
A trial experiment was conducted to investigate whether this
approach is feasible, and the results are promising. Various force-onforce engagements were modeled utilizing the 42 meaningfully different configurations of a 7-3-7-1 networked force for both BLUE and
RED. Since each of these configurations contains the same numbers
of Sensors, Deciders, and Influencers, differing only in their connectivity, it is most likely that any difference in performance would
be a consequence of this connectivity difference. A comprehensive
test of each of these 42 configurations against each other required
1,764 different engagements. Each engagement was represented by
30 replications, each with a random distribution of the BLUE and
RED nodes across the battlespace. A graphical representation of the
results is presented in figure 6.




p(BLUE Win)


1.821

2.280

BLUE ȜPFE

RED ȜPFE
1.821

2.280

Figure 6. The probability of a BLUE Win for each of the 42 BLUE
configurations (with λBLUE values varying from 1.821 to 2.280) against
each of the 42 RED configurations (also with λRED values varying
from 1.821 to 2.280). Surface values > 0.5 are shaded blue and surface values < 0.5 are shaded red.

These initial results indicate that as the BLUE force is organized to
enhance its networked effects (i.e., the λPFE value increases) its effectiveness generally increases. While the resulting surface is far from
smooth a general trend does appear: the smaller the λPFE value, the
smaller the probability of a win. The outlying configurations may be
due to the increased vulnerability of those configurations but con-
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tinued investigation is necessary. This trend becomes more apparent
in figure 7 where the probability of a BLUE win is averaged over all
RED configurations. Note that many BLUE configurations had an
identical λPFE value (there were 13 unique λPFE values for the 42 configurations). Clearly, it appears that the probability of a BLUE win
increases for those BLUE configurations with a greater λPFE value. A
simple linear regression confirms this with a coefficient of determination (R2) equal to 0.896.
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Figure 7. The average probability of a BLUE win for each of the 42
meaningfully different configurations of a 7-3-7-1 BLUE force.

These initial results are tentative. They are the result of a series of
experiments conducted in support of an ongoing PhD thesis at Old
Dominion University. Future work within this research must evaluate if this trend holds for other configurations as well, and then show
how to generalize these insights.
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Related and Future Work
So far, agent-based models were used in support of finding closed
mathematical solutions. The insights gained from such efforts should
not be underestimated. However, the assumptions may simplify the
underlying problem too much for application in other domains of
simulation systems, in particular training and support to operations (Sokolowski and Banks 2008). Therefore, ongoing work is in
progress at the Virginia Modeling Analysis and Simulation Center
(Bowen 2008, Tolk 2008) and at Alidade Incorporated (Bell 2008) to
eliminate several of the simplifying assumptions used in the present
work and to extend the IACM.
In the present work, the rules governing the actions of each node
and the strategy for communication between nodes were executed
with complete certainty. Many military applications, however, must
work with probabilities instead. In addition to probabilities associated with the nodes (for example, probability of detection or probability of kill), communication probabilities must be introduced. This
results in a re-interpretation of the adjacency matrix A. The row and
column indices still represent the nodes, and the matrix elements
represent the links. Where no link exists, the matrix element is zero.
Where a link exists, the matrix element can adopt a value between
zero and one, that is, Aij = x (with 0 < x ≤ 1), where x represents the
likelihood that the intended use of this link is accomplished. The
probability distribution of Aij can be specified by the model developer, and the expected value x can be used in connection with many
well-known methods for network analysis. When the link represents
assured communication, x becomes equal to one, and the adjacency
matrix assumes the form used in the present work.
In an effort to make the IACM more useful to traditional combat
model developers for applications in the domains of training and
operational support, Tolk et al. (2008) have proposed the addition
of a new type of node, the Communication node. This node can be
used in a number of ways. It can represent a communication prob-
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ability less than one, rather than assigning this function to a link. It
can provide bidirectional communication, as when a Decider both
receives reports from a Sensor and tasks the Sensor to (for example)
change position or area of observation. It can also extend the range
of communication between the other nodes or provide communication around obstacles. In military operations communications is
the foundation of orchestrated campaigns. Insuring communications
by distributing and protecting the means (communication nodes) as
well as denying the opponent the gained situational awareness by
destroying or jamming his communication nodes can contribute
decisively to the success or failure of a campaign.
Figure 8 shows the resulting enhanced IACM as implemented in
a prototype (Bowen 2008). In this prototype, the interpretation for
links between Influencers and Targets are hit and kill probabilities
– P(Hit) x P(Kill) –, sensing probabilities for links between Targets
and Sensors – P(Sense) –, and probabilities for successful communications between nodes – P(Commo). Furthermore, every node is
interpreted as a target for the opposing force.

C

I
P(Hit)xP(Kill)

D

P(Commo)

T
P(Sense)

C

S

Figure 8. The enhanced IACM includes communication nodes and
uses probability values in the adjacency matrix.
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This enhanced IACM eliminates some of the restrictions on link type
imposed in the present work. Additional restrictions are removed in
models under development (Bell 2008) that provide for coordination
among multiple Deciders, sharing of control of an Influencer by
several Deciders, and sharing of Sensor reports among Deciders.
These models focus on the planning process: the principal role of
the Deciders is to develop and distribute sensing and engagement
plans to be executed by the Sensors and Influencers. Since the additional links available in these models can be used to develop added
combat power, it is expected that, as in the present work, greater values of λPFE will be associated with increases in combat effectiveness.
An ambitious prototypical application of the IACM (Bowen 2008)
integrates it into a larger framework for agent-based combat simulation. As the model described before, this version is also implemented
in Netlogo (Wilenski 1999). In this first prototype that may evolve
into a new generation of combat models, everything is modeled as
an agent: environmental objects (trees, buildings, roads, etc.), combat systems (Influencers, Sensors, Deciders), and the effects (communication, attrition, and sensing). Each entity represents one or
more roles as defined in the IACM. The agent executions result in
a bipartite directed graph that connects entity agents (environment
objects and combat systems) via effect agents as shown in figure 9.
In this interpretation of the model, an Influencer creates an effect
agent with the desired effect.
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Figure 9. A bipartite directed graph of an example combat cycle in
the enhanced IACM.

While in traditional models this effect is directed against an intended
Target, in this model it is the effect agent that identifies which Target or Targets with which it is going to connect. This allows modeling of all effects that influence combat significantly, including those
that are normally unintentional such as fratricide or self-jamming
of communications. It also allows the cascading of effects and other
effect-based models as envisioned by Smith (2002). The initial results
obtained from a demonstration model are very promising, exhibiting the ability to represent network centric operations and demonstrating the employment of effect agents to allow a more realistic
agent interaction with the environment and to extend the effect of
an interaction beyond the two primary parties involved.
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Summary & Conclusion
Meeting the security challenges of the twenty-first century will
require innovative approaches to implementing the functions of
command and control in the Information Age. Selecting the right
approach requires an understanding of the potential networked
effects of a combat force resulting from quantifiable metrics that
properly represent the interdependencies and complex local behaviors of Information Age warfare.
This paper presented an initial attempt to achieve such understanding through the use of the Perron-Frobenius Eigenvalue (λPFE) as a
measure of the ability of a network to produce feedback effects in
general and combat power specifically in the case of the IACM. The
results of the agent-based modeling presented in this paper indicate
that the value of the λPFE is a significant measurement of the performance of an Information Age combat force. Consequently, the
IACM can provide useful insights to inform the difficult decisions
and trade-offs during the ongoing transformation into an Information Age combat force. The ideas presented here can be applied
to the development of a new generation of combat simulations to
support war fighting at the operational and tactical levels. While no
practical systems have yet been implemented, the success of initial
prototypes provides reason to believe that it will be possible to overcome the obstacles that often block the use of simulation tools to
support analysis, planning, and execution of current operations.
The IACM can be generalized beyond attrition applications. Since
the IACM is focused on network capability, the abstract representation of the acts of sensing (information), deciding, and influencing (whether it be combat or some other action taken) enable it to
model almost any activity involving planning and decision making.
The nodes represent capabilities and the connections the accessibility (and, if the enhanced IACM is applied, the probability to have
access to the capability). Each mission consists of certain required
capabilities and their connectivity can therefore be represented as
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a network. The likelihood of success for a mission can be directly
mapped to the connectivity of its required capabilities. That connectivity can be informed by the quantitative metric (λPFE value)
addressed in this work. As such, this paper is not limited to merely
addressing net-centric attrition but can be applied to all kinds of netcentric operations as described in the NATO Code of Best Practice
for C2 Assessment (2002), among others.
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